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Abstract
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shap-
ley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and
Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash
equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely im-
plementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution
is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii)
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1 Introduction
We consider the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974)
with strict preferences. There is a group of agents, each of whom initially owns
one object.1 A solution reallocates the objects with the condition that each agent
consumes one and only one object. Important real-life examples of this model are
the assignment of campus housing to students (Abdulkadiro·glu and SÄonmez, 1999;
Chen and SÄonmez, 2002, 2004; and SÄonmez and ÄUnver, 2005) and kidney exchange
(Roth, SÄonmez, and ÄUnver, 2004).
In this context, the \strict core solution" is a central one since it satis¯es var-
ious desirable properties. Some characterizations of the solution can be found in
Ma (1994), Svensson (1999), Takamiya (2001), and Miyagawa (2002). Furthermore,
the solution is dominant strategy implementable (Mizukami and Wakayama, 2007)
and Nash implementable when there are at least three agents (SÄonmez, 1996). How-
ever, these results do not guarantee that the solution is securely implementable (Saijo,
SjÄostÄom, and Yamato, 2007); note that here, the notion of implementation signi¯es
double implementation in the two equilibrium concepts. Thus, it is natural to raise
the following question: Can the strict core solution be securely implemented? In
fact, the answer to this question is no (Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato, 2007). Based
on the result, this paper seeks solutions that can be securely implemented in our
model.
Our main results consist of two parts. We ¯rst focus on the two-agent case.
In this case, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable so-
lutions; a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant
solution or a \serial dictatorship." By a serial dictatorship, we mean that one agent
chooses her best object from among the set of objects, then the second agent chooses
his best object from among the set of remaining objects, then the third agent chooses,
and so on; the order in which agents make their choices is ¯xed in advance.
Next, we consider the general case where there are more than two agents. In
contrast to the two-agent case, it is hard to characterize the class of securely im-
plementable solutions in the general case. Thus, in the general case, we then pin
down smaller classes of securely implementable solutions by adding some properties.
1In this paper, the sets of agents and objects are ¯xed. Some studies consider object allocation
problems where either the set of agents or the set of objects varies; for instance, Ergin (2000),
Ehlers, Klaus, and P¶apai (2002), and Ehlers and Klaus (2003a) consider house allocation problems
where each agent consumes at most one object, and Klaus and Miyagawa (2001) and Ehlers and
Klaus (2003b) consider multiple assignment problems where agents may consume more than one
object.
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First, we show that the \no-trade solution" is the unique securely implementable
one that satis¯es individual rationality (no agent is worse o® after trading with other
agents). The no-trade solution is the one that selects the initial endowments for each
preference pro¯le. Second, we prove that a securely implementable solution satis¯es
neutrality (symmetric treatment of objects) if and only if it is a serial dictatorship.
Finally, we establish that an e±cient solution is securely implementable if and only
if it is a \sequential dictatorship." For any sequential dictatorship, there exists the
¯rst dictator in every preference pro¯le. However, in contrast to serial dictatorships,
in the sequential dictatorship, the second agent, who chooses his best object from
among the set of remaining objects, is decided by the choice of the ¯rst dictator.
Similarly, the third agent is decided by the choices of the previous agents, and so on.
As far as we know, ours is the ¯rst result that characterizes the class of sequential
dictatorships in Shapley-Scarf housing markets.
Our model has a close relationship with multiple assignment problems. Klaus
and Miyagawa (2001) show that serial dictatorships are the only ones that satisfy
e±ciency and strategy-proofness in the two-agent case. In the general case, P¶apai
(2001) and Ehlers and Klaus (2003b) characterize sequential dictatorships by means
of e±ciency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. Their characterizations still hold
even if strategy-proofness and non-bossiness are replaced by secure implementability.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the results of Klaus and Miyagawa
(2001), P¶apai (2001), and Ehlers and Klaus (2003b) do not hold in our model. This
is because the strict core solution satis¯es e±ciency, strategy-proofness, and non-
bossiness. Therefore, results in multiple assignment problems cannot directly apply
to our model.
When monetary transfers are admissible, Fujinaka and Wakayama (2008) show
that constant solutions are the only ones that are securely implementable. This
means that many solutions including \¯xed-price core solutions" (Miyagawa, 2001)
that satisfy many desirable properties are not securely implementable when mone-
tary transfers are allowed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides basic notation
and de¯nitions. Section 3 addresses the two-agent case. Section 4 analyzes the
general case. Section 5 discusses our results. Section 6 concludes the paper. Ap-
pendix A contains the proofs of the results omitted from the main text. Appendix
B proves that the strict core solution is dominant strategy implemented by its as-
sociated direct revelation mechanism; further, the strict core solution is not Nash
implementable in the case of two agents.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The model
We denote the set of agents by N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, where 2 · n < +1. Each agent
i 2 N owns one object, denoted by i. Thus, N also stands for the set of objects.
Each agent i 2 N has a complete and transitive binary relation %i over N , i.e.,
a preference relation. We denote the associated strict preference relation by Âi and
indi®erent relation by »i. We assume that all preferences are strict; i.e., for each
h; k 2 N , if h »i k, then h = k. Let P denote the set of all strict preferences.
A preference pro¯le is a list of preferences % ´ (%1;%2; : : : ;%n) 2 PN . We often
denote N nfig by \¡i." With this notation, (%0i;%¡i) is the preference pro¯le where
agent i has %0i and agent j 6= i has %j. Similarly, given S µ N , we denote N n S
by \¡S," and (%0S;%¡S) is the preference pro¯le where each agent i 2 S has %0i
and each agent i =2 S has %i. We often represent %i by an ordered list of objects as
follows:
%i: h1; h2; h3; : : :
This means that agent i prefers object h1 the most; further, i prefers h1 to h2, h2 to
h3, and so on.
An allocation is a bijection x : N ! N . Let x(i) denote the object allocated to
agent i 2 N . For convenience, we use the notation xi instead of x(i). Let X be the
set of allocations.
2.2 Solutions
A solution is a function f : PN ! X that associates an allocation x 2 X with each
preference pro¯le % 2PN . Let fi(%) denote the object allocated to agent i at %.
Let x; y 2 X and S µ N with S 6= ;. Then, x weakly dominates y via S at
% 2 PN if S = Si2Sfxig, and xi %i yi for each i 2 S and xj Âj yj for some
j 2 S. The strict core for % 2PN is the set of all allocations that are not weakly
dominated by any other allocation at % 2 PN . The strict core solution is the
solution C : PN ! X such that for each % 2PN , C(%) is the strict core for %.2
A solution f is constant if there exists x 2 X such that for each % 2 PN ,
2Under strict preferences, the strict core is a singleton for every preference pro¯le (Roth and
Postlewaite, 1977). Thus, the strict core solution C is well-de¯ned.
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f(%) = x. In particular, we term the constant solution that selects the initial
endowments for each preference pro¯le as the no-trade solution.
A permutation ¼ on N is a bijection ¼ : N ! N . Let ¦N denote the set of all
permutations on N . Given that i 2 N and S µ N , let b(%i; S) be agent i's most
preferred object under %i in S, i.e., b(%i; S) 2 S and for each h 2 S, b(%i; S) %i h.
A solution f is a sequential choice function if for each % 2 PN , there exists a
permutation ¼% 2 ¦N such that
f¼%(1)(%) = b(%¼%(1); N);
f¼%(2)(%) = b(%¼%(2); N n ff¼%(1)(%)g);
f¼%(3)(%) = b(%¼%(3); N n [ff¼%(1)(%)g [ ff¼%(2)(%)g]);
...
f¼%(n)(%) = b
Ã
%¼%(n); N
-"
n¡1[
i=1
n
f¼%(i)(%)
o#!
:
We then say that ¼%(i) is the i-th dictator at %.
The class of sequential dictatorships is a subclass of sequential choice functions.
For any sequential dictatorship, there exists a unique ¯rst dictator who chooses her
best object in every preference pro¯le. However, the second dictator, who chooses his
best object from among the set of remaining objects, is decided by the choice of the
¯rst dictator. Similarly, the next dictator is decided by the choices of the previous
dictators. Formally, a solution f is a sequential dictatorship if it is a sequential choice
function that satis¯es the following properties: for each %;%0 2 PN , (i) ¼%(1) =
¼%0(1) and (ii) for each j 2 N n f1g, if ¼%(i) = ¼%0(i) and f¼%(i)(%) = f¼%0 (i)(%0) for
each i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; j ¡ 1g, then ¼%(j) = ¼%0(j).
The class of serial dictatorship is a subclass of sequential dictatorships. For any
serial dictatorship, the order in which an agent chooses an object from the set of
remaining objects is ¯xed. That is, the order does not depend on the choices of the
previous dictators. Formally, a solution f is a serial dictatorship if it is a sequential
dictatorship and there exists ¹¼ 2 ¦N such that for each % 2PN , ¼% = ¹¼.
2.3 Axioms and secure implementation
In this subsection, we ¯rst de¯ne a number of basic axioms. The ¯rst axiom is a
voluntary participation condition, according to which no agent receives an object
that she considers worse than her endowment.
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Individual rationality: For each % 2PN and each i 2 N , fi(%) %i i.
The next axiom says that it is impossible to make an agent better o® without
making someone else worse o®.
E±ciency: For each % 2 PN , there does not exist x 2 X such that xi %i fi(%)
for each i 2 N and xj Âj fj(%) for some j 2 N .
The next axiom states that a solution is de¯ned independently of the names of
the objects. For each % 2PN and each ¼ 2 ¦N , let T (%; ¼) be a preference pro¯le
%0 such that for each i; j; k 2 N ,
j %i k () ¼(j) %0i ¼(k):
Neutrality: For each % 2 PN , each ¼ 2 ¦N , and each i 2 N , fi(T (%; ¼)) =
¼(fi(%)).
The last axiom states that no agent can obtain a bene¯t by misrepresenting her
preferences.
Strategy-proofness: For each % 2PN , each i 2 N , and each %0i 2P, fi(%) %i
fi(%0i;%¡i).
The strict core solution is the central solution in our model. The reason for this is
that the strict core solution is the only one that satis¯es strategy-proofness, e±ciency,
and individual rationality (Ma, 1994).3 Moreover, the solution is dominant strategy
implementable (See Appendix B) and Nash implementable when there are at least
three agents (SÄonmez, 1996).
Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato (2007) say that a solution is securely implementable
if there exists a mechanism that doubly implements the solution in dominant strat-
egy and Nash equilibria.4 They provide a characterization of the class in the abstract
setting:5
Proposition 1 (Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato, 2007). A solution is securely
implementable if and only if it satis¯es strategy-proofness and the rectangular prop-
erty.
3The strict core solution satis¯es not only strategy-proofness (Roth, 1982) but also coalitional
strategy-proofness (Bird, 1984). Other studies on coalitional strategy-proofness are, for example,
Takamiya (2001) and Ehlers (2002). See those for the de¯nition of coalitional strategy-proofness.
4See Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato (2007) for the formal de¯nition of secure implementation.
5Mizukami and Wakayama (2008) provide an alternative characterization of securely imple-
mentable solutions.
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Rectangular property: For each %;%0 2 PN , if fi(%0) = fi(%i;%0¡i) for each
i 2 N , then f(%) = f(%0).
Note that the rectangular property implies non-bossiness, according to which
when each agent unilaterally changes her preference report, she cannot in°uence the
total allocation without changing her own consumption.
Non-bossiness: For each % 2 PN , each i 2 N , and each %0i 2 P, if fi(%) =
fi(%0i;%¡i), then f(%) = f(%0i;%¡i).
Fact 1. If f satis¯es the rectangular property, then it satis¯es non-bossiness.
Since the strict core solution is both dominant strategy implementable and Nash
implementable, one might conjecture that it is securely implementable. However,
Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato (2004) point out that the strict core solution is not
securely implementable.6 To see this, consider the following example:
Example 1. Suppose that N = f1; 2; 3g. Let % 2 PN and %01;%02 2 P be such
that
%1 : 1; 2; 3; %01 : 2; 1; 3;
%2 : 1; 2; 3; %02 : 2; 1; 3;
%3 : 3; 2; 1:
Then,
C(%1;%2;%3) = C(%1;%02;%3) = C(%01;%02;%3) = (1; 2; 3);
C(%01;%2;%3) = (2; 1; 3):
Since C(%1;%02;%3) = C(%01;%02;%3) and C(%1;%02;%3) = C(%1;%2;%3), the rect-
angular property requires that C(%1;%02;%3) = C(%01;%2;%3). However, since
C(%1;%02;%3) 6= C(%01;%2;%3), the strict core solution violates the rectangular
property and is thus not securely implementable.7 ¥
Thus, this paper seeks to identify which solutions are securely implementable.
6Saijo, SjÄostrÄom, and Yamato (2004) illustrate this for the two-agent case. However, as we show
in Appendix B, the strict core solution is not even Nash implementable in the two-agent case. On
the other hand, it is Nash implementable when there are at least three agents. Thus, it is not
obvious whether the strict core solution is securely implementable when there are three or more
agents.
7This can be directly derived from Theorem 2.
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3 The two-agent case
In this section, we consider the two-agent case. For each i 2 N , let
%12i : 1; 2;
%21i : 2; 1:
Proposition 2 provides a complete characterization of the class of solutions satisfying
strategy-proofness and the rectangular property in the two-agent case.
Proposition 2. Assume n = 2. A solution f satis¯es strategy-proofness and the
rectangular property if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dicta-
torship.
Proof. It is easy to verify the \if" part. We prove the \only if" part below. Let f
be a solution satisfying the two axioms. We now discuss the following two cases:
Case 1: f(%121 ;%
12
2 ) = (1;2). If f(%121 ;%212 ) = (2; 1), then f2(%121 ;%212 ) Â122
f2(%121 ;%122 ), which is in violation of strategy-proofness. Therefore, f(%121 ;%212 ) =
(1; 2).
We ¯rst consider the case f(%211 ;%122 ) = (1; 2). By the rectangular property,
f(%211 ;%212 ) = (1; 2). Hence, f is constant.
Next, we consider the case f(%211 ;%122 ) = (2; 1). If f(%211 ;%212 ) = (1; 2), then, by
the rectangular property, f(%211 ;%122 ) = (1; 2). This is a contradiction. Therefore,
f(%211 ;%212 ) = (2; 1). Then, f1(%) = b(%1; N) for each % 2 PN . This implies that
f is a serial dictatorship.
Case 2: f(%121 ;%
12
2 ) = (2;1). By an argument similar to that in Case 1, we
have that f is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.
The two axioms in Proposition 2 are independent. It is easily veri¯able that
the strict core solution satis¯es strategy-proofness but violates the rectangular prop-
erty. The following solution satis¯es the rectangular property but violates strategy-
proofness: for each % 2PN ,
f(%) =
(
(2; 1) if % = (%121 ;%212 );
C(%) otherwise:
By Proposition 1, we immediately obtain the characterization of the class of
securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
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Theorem 1. Assume n = 2. A solution f is securely implementable if and only if
it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.
Considering other axioms, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Assume n = 2.
1. An individually rational solution f is securely implementable if and only if it
is the no-trade solution.
2. A neutral solution f is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial
dictatorship.
3. An e±cient solution f is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial
dictatorship.
4 The general case
In contrast to the two-agent case, in the general case where there are more than two
agents, there exists a securely implementable solution other than constant solutions
and serial dictatorships. To verify this, consider the following example:
Example 2. Let N = f1; 2; 3g. Let f be a solution satisfying the following: for
each % 2PN ,
f(%) =
(
(2; 1; 3) if 1 Â2 3;
(2; 3; 1) if 3 Â2 1:
It is easy to see that the solution is securely implementable. ¥
It would be expected that there are a lot of securely implementable solutions in
the general case. In fact, as we will see later, in the general case, there are several
di®erent types of securely implementable solutions. Thus, the main purpose of this
section is to characterize the class of securely implementable solutions satisfying a
certain property.
4.1 Individual rationality and neutrality
This subsection ¯rst considers the class of securely implementable solutions that
satisfy individual rationality. The next proposition would be helpful in characterizing
the class.
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Proposition 3. A solution f satis¯es individual rationality and the rectangular
property if and only if it is the no-trade solution.
Proof. Since the \if" part is obvious, it will su±ce to show the \only if" part. Let f
be a solution satisfying the two axioms. Let %0 2PN be such that for each i 2 N ,
b(%0i; N) = i. By individual rationality, fi(%0) = i for each i 2 N . Let % 2 PN .
Then, individual rationality implies that fi(%i;%0¡i) = i for each i 2 N . Hence,
by the rectangular property, f(%0) = f(%). This implies that f is the no-trade
solution.
It is easy to check that none of the axioms in Proposition 3 are redundant. The
strict core solution satis¯es individual rationality but violates the rectangular prop-
erty. A constant solution that is not the no-trade solution satis¯es the rectangular
property but violates individual rationality.
Interestingly, Proposition 3 enables us to pin down the class of securely imple-
mentable solutions satisfying individual rationality without using strategy-proofness.
Thus, we immediately obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. An individually rational solution f is securely implementable if and
only if it is the no-trade solution.
Next, we consider the class of securely implementable solutions that satisfy neu-
trality. Svensson (1999) establishes that a solution is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and
neutral if and only if it is a serial dictatorship.8 From the logical relationship between
the rectangular property and non-bossiness, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3. A neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial
dictatorship.
4.2 E±ciency
In this subsection, we characterize the class of securely implementable solutions that
satisfy e±ciency. We ¯rst provide a characterization of the class of solutions that
satisfy strategy-proofness, the rectangular property, and e±ciency.
Proposition 4. A solution f satis¯es strategy-proofness, the rectangular property,
and e±ciency if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship.
8Svensson (1999) considers a situation where the total number of objects is at least as great as
the number of agents. Therefore, Theorem 3 holds in this situation.
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Proof. The \if" part. Let f be a sequential dictatorship. Since it is obvious that
f satis¯es e±ciency, we show that f satis¯es strategy-proofness and the rectangular
property.
² Strategy-proofness: Let % 2PN , j 2 N , and %0j 2P be such that ¼%(k) = j.
First, let k = 1. Then, obviously, j cannot manipulate at %. Next, let
k = 2. Since the ¯rst dictator ¼%(1) (= ¼(%0j ;%¡j)(1)) reveals the same prefer-
ence %¼%(1) at both % and (%0j;%¡j), it holds that f¼%(1)(%) = f¼%(1)(%0j;%¡j).
Therefore, ¼%(2) = ¼(%0j ;%¡j)(2) = j. Since fj(%) = b
³
%j; N
/n
f¼%(1)(%)
o´
and fj(%0j;%¡j) = b
³
%0j; N
/n
f¼%(1)(%0j;%¡j)
o´
= b
³
%0j; N
/n
f¼%(1)(%)
o´
,
agent j cannot manipulate at %. Repeating a similar argument for each
k 2 f3; 4; : : : ; ng, we can establish that f is strategy-proof.
² Rectangular property: Let %;%0 2 PN be such that for all i 2 N , fi(%0) =
fi(%i;%0¡i). Without loss of generality, we assume that ¼%0(i) = i for each i 2
N . First, let us consider agent 1. Note that ¼%0(1) = ¼(%1;%0¡1)(1) = ¼%(1) = 1.
Then, f1(%0) = f1(%1;%0¡1) implies b(%01; N) = b(%1; N). Therefore,
f1(%0) = b(%01; N) = b(%1; N) = f1(%): (1)
Next, let us consider agent 2, who is the second dictator at %0. Since agent
1 reveals the same preference relation %01 at both %0 and (%2;%0¡2), f1(%0) =
f1(%2;%0¡2). Thus, ¼%0(2) = ¼(%2;%0¡2)(2) = 2. Then, f1(%
0) = f1(%2;%0¡2)
and f2(%0) = f2(%2;%0¡2) together imply that
b (%02; N n ff1(%0)g) = b (%2; N n ff1(%0)g) : (2)
Furthermore, by (1), ¼%0(2) = ¼%(2) = 2. Therefore, (1) and (2) together
imply that
f2(%0) = b (%02; N n ff1(%0)g) = b (%2; N n ff1(%)g) = f2(%):
Iterating a similar augment for the other agents in N yields f(%0) = f(%).
The \only if" part. Let f be a solution satisfying the three axioms. We begin by
proving that there exists the ¯rst dictator. For each i 2 N , let %^i be such that
%^i : n; n¡ 1; : : : ; k + 1; k; k ¡ 1; : : : ; 2; 1:
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Let %^ ´ (%^1; %^2; : : : ; %^n). Without loss of generality, assume that for each i 2 N ,
fi(%^) = i. For each k 2 N , let Nk ´ f1; 2; : : : ; kg. We establish the following claim:
Claim 1. For each k 2 N and each %Nk 2PNk ,
fi(%Nk ; %^¡Nk) = i 8 i 2 N nNk;
fk(%Nk ; %^¡Nk) = b(%k; Nk):
The proof for Claim 1 can be found in Appendix A. When k = n, Claim 1 implies
that for each % 2PN , fn(%) = b(%n; N). Therefore, agent n is the ¯rst dictator.
Now, we show that f is a sequential dictatorship. Since agent n is the ¯rst
dictator, we can set ¼%(1) = n and fn(%) = b(%n; N) for each % 2 PN . We will
now establish the following claim:
Claim 2. For each % 2PN and each %0¡n 2PNnfng, if for each i 2 N n fng,
c %i d () c %0i d 8 c; d 2 N n fb(%n; N)g; (3)
then f(%) = f(%n;%0¡n).
The proof for Claim 2 can be found in Appendix A. Pick any % 2 PN . Let
a ´ b(%n; N). Let PjNnfag denote the set of all strict preferences %ijNnfag over
N n fag. Then, let fa : ¡PjNnfag¢Nnfng ! N n fag be a solution such that for each
i 2 N n fng, fai (%jNnfag) = fi(%) where for each i 2 N , b(%i; N) = a and for each
i 2 N n fng,
c %ijNnfag d () c %i d 8 c; d 2 N n fag:
Since f satis¯es strategy-proofness, the rectangular property, and e±ciency, fa also
satis¯es the three axioms. Therefore, by adopting an argument similar to that for
proving that there is the ¯rst dictator of f , we can prove that there is a dictator of
fa. Let j(a) be the dictator of fa. Then,
fj(a)(%) = fj(a)(%n;%0¡n) = faj(a)(%jNnfag) = b(%j(a)jNnfag; N n fag) = b(%j(a); N n fag);
where for each i 2 N n fng, %0i is a preference relation such that b(%0i; N) = a and
(3) holds; the ¯rst equation follows from Claim 2. Hence, we observe that for each
% 2PN , if b(%n; N) = a, then ¼%(2) = j(a) and fj(a)(%) = b(%j(a); N n fag).
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By repeating a similar argument, we can establish that f is a sequential dicta-
torship.
Remark. We can see that the proof of Proposition 4, particularly Claim 1, does
not work in a situation where the null object, which means \not receiving any real
object," may be preferred to a real object. Therefore, we cannot apply Proposi-
tion 4 to such a situation. On the other hand, the proof can be extended, in a
straightforward way, to a situation where every real object is preferred to the null
object.
It is easy to verify that the \only if" part of Proposition 4 does not hold when any
of the three axioms|e±ciency, strategy-proofness, and the rectangular property|
is dropped. The strict core solution satis¯es e±ciency and strategy-proofness but
violates the rectangular property. The no-trade solution satis¯es strategy-proofness,
and the rectangular property but violates e±ciency. Finally, the following solution
satis¯es e±ciency and the rectangular property but violates strategy-proofness: let
f be a sequential choice solution such that for each % 2Pf1;2;3g,
(¼%(1); ¼%(2); ¼%(3)) =
(
(1; 2; 3) if b(%i; N) = b(%j; N) 8 i; j 2 N ;
(2; 3; 1) otherwise:
The following result is a characterization of securely implementable solutions
satisfying e±ciency and follows easily from Proposition 4.
Theorem 4. An e±cient solution f is securely implementable if and only if it is a
sequential dictatorship.
It is well-known that strategy-proofness together with non-bossiness implies e±-
ciency as long as no alternative is excluded in advance (Takamiya, 2001); this is an
axiom called ontoness. This axiom can be expressed as follows:
Ontoness: For each x 2 X, there exists % 2PN such that f(%) = x.
Since ontoness is a necessary condition for e±ciency, ontoness deems a minimal
e±ciency condition. Then, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. An onto solution f is securely implementable if and only if it is a
sequential dictatorship.
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5 Discussions
5.1 Other securely implementable solutions
Thus far, we have considered securely implementable solutions satisfying certain
properties in the general case. Now, we present other securely implementable solu-
tions in the general case.
Example 2 (continued). It can easily be veri¯ed that f is securely implementable
but satis¯es none of the other axioms. ¥
Example 3. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. Let f be a solution satisfying the following: for
each % 2PN ,
f1(%) = b(%1; f1; 2; 3g);
f2(%) = b(%2; N n ff1(%)g);
f3(%) = b(%3; N n ff1(%); f2(%)g);
f4(%) = N nff1(%); f2(%); f3(%)g:
This solution is securely implementable but satis¯es none of the other axioms. ¥
It follows from Examples 2 and 3 that the class of securely implementable solu-
tions is expected to be of complicated form. Thus, the characterization of the class
of securely implementable solutions remains for future research.
5.2 Reallocation-proofness and anonymity
P¶apai (2000) studies solutions that are robust to pairwise manipulations through
reallocations of assignments. Such a robustness is formalized by a requirement that
rules out the possibility that any two agents can gain by swapping objects after
reporting dishonestly. This can be expressed as follows:
Reallocation-proofness: There does not exist % 2 PN , i; j 2 N , and %0fi;jg 2
Pfi;jg such that (i) fj(%0fi;jg;%¡fi;jg) %i fi(%), (ii) fi(%0fi;jg;%¡fi;jg) Âj fj(%),
and (iii) fh(%) = fh(%0h;%¡h) 6= fh(%0fi;jg;%¡fi;jg) for h = i; j.
P¶apai (2000) discusses reallocation-proofness as well as strategy-proofness, e±-
ciency, and non-bossiness. She establishes that a solution satis¯es the four axioms
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if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange solution.9 It immediately follows from the
de¯nitions that the rectangular property implies reallocation-proofness. Therefore,
Theorem 4 implies that any hierarchical exchange solution other than sequential
dictatorships is not securely implementable.
The next axiom, which is ¯rst introduced by Miyagawa (2002), is related to
fairness. It states that a solution does not depend on the names of agents and
objects. Given that % 2 PN and ¼ 2 ¦N , let T^ (%; ¼) be the preference pro¯le %0
de¯ned by the condition that for each i; j; k 2 N ,
j %i k () ¼(j) %0¼(i) ¼(k):
Anonymity: For each % 2 PN , each ¼ 2 ¦N , and each i 2 N , f¼(i)(T^ (%; ¼)) =
¼(fi(%)).
In the two-agent case, we obtain the following result from Theorem 2:
Theorem 5. Assume n = 2. An anonymous solution f is securely implementable
if and only if it is constant.
In the general case, characterizing the class of anonymous and securely imple-
mentable solutions is still an open question. We point out that the class in the case
n ¸ 4 may be substantially di®erent from that in the case n = 3. To verify this, we
de¯ne the modi¯ed strict core solution Cm, which is proposed by Miyagawa (2002):
for each % 2 PN , Cm(%) = C(%¤), where %¤ is a preference pro¯le such that for
each i 2 N , %¤i is identical to %i except for the agent's initial endowment; further,
the endowment ranking is worst at %¤i . It can easily be veri¯ed that the modi¯ed
strict core solution satis¯es the rectangular property in the case n = 3 although the
solution violates it in the case n ¸ 4. This hints toward a di®erence between the
characterization results.
5.3 Coalitional stability
As shown in Section 2, the strict core solution is not securely implementable. One
way to avoid this result is to consider an equilibrium concept related to coalitional
stability instead of Nash equilibrium. This approach is adopted from Bochet and
Sakai (2007), who study secure implementation in allotment economies. In our
model, Takamiya (2006) shows that the strict core solution is implemented by its
9See P¶apai (2000) for the formal de¯nition of a hierarchical exchange solution.
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associated direct revelation mechanism in strict strong Nash equilibria. Thus, it is
doubly implemented through dominant strategy and strict strong Nash equilibria.10
However, the characterization of the class of solutions that can be doubly imple-
mented through dominant strategy equilibrium and an equilibrium notion related
to coalitional stability remains for future research.
6 Conclusion
We succeeded in classifying the class of securely implementable solutions satisfy-
ing a certain property such as individual rationality, neutrality, and e±ciency in
Shapley-Scarf housing markets. This paper discussed a deterministic object alloca-
tion model and proved that a serial dictatorship is securely implementable but the
strict core solution is not. On the other hand, in a random allocation model, two
solutions related to a serial dictatorship and the strict core solution are equivalent:
Abdulkadiro·glu and SÄonmez (1998) establish the equivalence between the random
serial dictatorship and the core solution from random endowment.11 The examina-
tion of whether or not the solution is securely implementable and the identi¯cation of
the securely implementable solutions in the random allocation model are interesting
issues left for future research.
A Appendix: Proof of Claims
Before proving claims, we de¯ne monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) and provide a useful
fact. We denote by L(h;%i) ´ fk 2 N : h %i kg agent i's lower contour set of object
h 2 N at %i 2P.
Monotonicity: For each %;%0 2 PN , if L(fi(%);%i) µ L(fi(%);%0i) for each
i 2 N , then f(%) = f(%0).
Fact 2. If f satis¯es both strategy-proofness and the rectangular property, then it
satis¯es monotonicity.
Proof. It follows from Fact 1 and Theorem 4.12 in Takamiya (2001).
10Wako (2005) establishes that the strict core solution is strong Nash implementable by con-
structing a \natural" mechanism. However, the mechanism does not implement the solution via
dominant strategy equilibria.
11See Abdulkadiro·glu and SÄonmez (1998) for the formal de¯nitions of the two solutions.
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A.1 Proof of Claim 1
We now prove this claim by using an induction argument.
² Basic step: When k = 1, the claim holds: Pick any %1 2 P. Note that
f1(%^) = 1. Since L(1; %^1) = f1g, L(1; %^1) µ L(1;%1). Thus, by monotonic-
ity (Fact 2), f(%1; %^¡1) = f(%^). Therefore,
fi(%N1 ; %^¡N1) = i 8 i 2 N nN1;
f1(%N1 ; %^¡N1) = 1 = b(%1; N1):
² Induction hypothesis: When k = `¡ 1, it holds that for each %N`¡1 2PN`¡1 ,
fi(%N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1) = i 8 i 2 N nN`¡1; (4)
f`¡1(%N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1) = b(%`¡1; N`¡1): (5)
² Induction step: Let k = `. We will now prove the three steps.
Step 1: For each %N` 2PN` , f`(%N` ; %^¡N`) = b(%`;N`).
Let %N` 2 PN` . Furthermore, let x ´ f(%N` ; %^¡N`), y ´ f(%N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1),
b ´ b(%`; N`), and s ´ b(%`; N` n fbg). Note that by the induction hypothesis,
y` = `. Moreover, since y` = ` %^` x` by strategy-proofness, then x` 2 N`. There are
three cases:
Case 1-1: b = `. Since y` = ` and N` = L(`; %^`) µ L(`;%`), by monotonic-
ity (Fact 2), f`(%N` ; %^¡N`) = ` = b.
Case 1-2: s = `. By strategy-proofness, x` %` ` = y`. This and x` 2 N`
together imply that either x` = b or x` = `. Suppose that x` = `. By the induction
hypothesis, (4) implies that [
i2N`¡1
fyig = N`¡1: (6)
Since b 6= s = `, then b 2 N`¡1. Therefore, by (6), there exists j 2 N`¡1 such that
yj = b: (7)
De¯ne ¹%N`¡1 as follows:
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P1. ¹%j : `; b; : : : ;
P2. For each i 2 N`¡1 n fjg, ¹%i : yi; : : :
Since y` = ` = x`,
y` = x` = f`(%N` ; %^¡N`): (8)
For each i 2 N`¡1 nfjg, L(yi;%i) ½ N = L(yi; ¹%i). Thus, by monotonicity (Fact 2),
y = f(%N`¡1nfig; ¹%i; %^¡N`¡1): (9)
By the induction hypothesis, f`(%N`¡1nfjg; ¹%j; %^¡N`¡1) = `, which implies
fj(%N`¡1nfjg; ¹%j; %^¡N`¡1) 6= `:
Then, by (7) and strategy-proofness,
yj = b = fj(%N`¡1nfjg; ¹%j; %^¡N`¡1): (10)
Then (8), (9), and (10) together imply that by the rectangular property,
f( ¹%N`¡1 ;%`; %^¡N`) = y: (11)
Thus,
b Â` ` = f`( ¹%N`¡1 ;%`; %^¡N`);
` ¹Âj b = fj( ¹%N`¡1 ;%`; %^¡N`);
which is a contradiction to e±ciency. Hence, x` = b.
Case 1-3: b 6= ` and s 6= `. Pick any %0` such that b(%0`; N) = b and
b(%0`; N n fbg) = `. Then, by Case 1-2, f`(%N`¡1 ;%0`; %^¡N`) = b. Since x` 2 N`, by
strategy-proofness, x` = b.
Step 2: For each %N` 2PN` and each i 2N`, fi(%N` ; %^¡N`) 2N`.
Pick any %N` 2 PN` . Let x ´ f(%N` ; %^¡N`) and b ´ b(%`; N`). By Step 1,
x` = b. Let %0` be such that b0 ´ b(%0`; N`) = b and L(b0;%0`) = N`. Let %0N`¡1 be
such that for each i 2 N`¡1, b(%0i; N) = b0 and the ordering other than b0 is the same
as that of %i. Let x0 ´ f(%0N` ; %^¡N`). By Step 1, x0` = b0.
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We ¯rst show that x0i 2 N` for each i 2 N`. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there exist j 2 N`¡1 such that x0j =2 N`. Then,
x0j Â0` b0;
b0 Â0j x0j;
which is a contradiction to e±ciency. Thus, x0i 2 N` for each i 2 N`.
Next, we show that x = x0. By Step 1, x0i 6= b0 for each i 2 N`¡1. Therefore,
for each i 2 N`¡1, by the de¯nition of %0i, we have either L(x0i;%i) = L(x0i;%0i)
or L(x0i;%i) = L(x0i;%0i) [ fb0g. This implies that L(x0i;%0i) µ L(x0i;%i) for each
i 2 N`¡1. By monotonicity (Fact 2), for each i 2 N`¡1,
x0 = f(%0N`nfig;%i; %^¡N`): (12)
Furthermore, by Step 1,
x0` = b
0 = b = f`(%0N`¡1 ;%`; %^¡N`): (13)
By (12) and (13), the rectangular property implies that x = x0.
Hence, we obtain xi = x
0
i 2 N` for each i 2 N`.
Step 3: For each %N` 2PN` and each i 2N nN`, fi(%N` ; %^¡N`) = i.
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist %N` 2PN` and i 2 N nN` such that
fi(%N` ; %^¡N`) 6= i: (14)
We now construct the preference pro¯le %¤N` as follows:
P¤1. %¤` : n; n¡ 1; : : : ; `+ 2; `+ 1; b(%`; N`), . . . ;
P¤2. For each j 2 N`¡1, b(%¤j ; N) = fj(%N` ; %^¡N`).
By Step 1,
f`(%N`¡1 ;%¤` ; %^¡N`) = b(%
¤
` ; N`) = b(%`; N`) = f`(%N` ; %^¡N`): (15)
For each j 2 N`¡1, by strategy-proofness,
fj(%N`nfjg;%¤j ; %^¡N`) = fj(%N` ; %^¡N`): (16)
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By (15) and (16), the rectangular property implies that
f(%¤N` ; %^¡N`) = f(%N` ; %^¡N`): (17)
Then, (14) and (17) together imply that fi(%¤N` ; %^¡N`) 6= i. Note that by Step 2,
we have [
k2NnN`
n
fk(%¤N` ; %^¡N`)
o
= N nN`:
Therefore, there exists j 2 N n N` such that j > fj(%¤N` ; %^¡N`). Now, let %¤¤j be
such that
%¤¤j : n; n¡ 1; : : : ; j + 1; j; b(%¤` ; N`); fj(%¤N` ; %^¡N`); : : :
Let x¤ ´ f(%¤N` ;%¤¤j ; %^¡(N`[fjg)) and y¤ ´ f(%¤N` ; %^¡N`). By strategy-proofness,
x¤j %¤¤j y¤j . If x¤j ¸ j, then x¤j Â^j y¤j , which is a contradiction to strategy-proofness.
Therefore, we have either x¤j = b(%¤` ; N`) or x¤j = y¤j .
Case 3-1: x¤j = y
¤
j . By non-bossiness (Fact 1), x
¤ = y¤. Then, since y¤j 2 NnN`
and y¤` = b(%¤` ; N`) by Step 1,
b(%¤` ; N`) Â¤¤j y¤j = x¤j ;
y¤j Â¤` b(%¤` ; N`) = x¤` ;
which is a contradiction to e±ciency.
Case 3-2: x¤j = b(%
¤
` ;N`). By e±ciency, x
¤
` Â¤` b(%¤` ; N`); otherwise, we
de¯ne the allocation z as follows:
Z1. For each k 2 N`¡1, zk = b(%¤k; N);
Z2. zj = b(%¤` ; N`);
Z3. For each k 2 fh 2 N n (N` [ fjg) : x¤h 2 N nN`g, zk = x¤k.
Z1, P¤2, and (17) together imply that zk = yk for each k 2 N`¡1. Step 1 implies that
zj = y`. Thus, by Step 2,
S
k2N`¡1[fjgfzkg = N`, which implies that zk 2 N nN` for
each k 2 N n (N`¡1 [ fjg). Therefore, by Z1, Z2, and Z3,
z` Â¤` b(%¤` ; N`) Â¤` x¤` ;
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zj »¤¤j x¤j ;
zk %^k x¤k 8 k 2 N n (N` [ fjg) ;
zh %¤h x¤h 8h 2 N`¡1:
Then the allocation z Pareto dominates x¤, which is a contradiction to e±ciency.
Thus, x¤` 2 N n N`. Then, L(x¤` ;%¤`) µ L(x¤` ; %^`). Therefore, by monotonic-
ity (Fact 2),
x¤ = f(%¤N`¡1 ;%
¤¤
j ; %^¡(N`¡1[fjg)): (18)
By the induction hypothesis, j = fj(%¤N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1). Then, L(j; %^j) µ L(j;%¤¤j ).
Therefore, by monotonicity (Fact 2),
f(%¤N`¡1 ;%
¤¤
j ; %^¡(N`¡1[fjg)) = f(%
¤
N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1): (19)
Then, (18) and (19) together imply that x¤ = f(%¤N`¡1 ; %^¡N`¡1). This is a contra-
diction to x¤j = b(%¤` ; N`) 6= j = fj(%¤N`¡1 ; %^¡N`). ¤
A.2 Proof of Claim 2
Pick any % 2 PN . Let %0¡n 2 PNnfng be such that (3) holds. Let us consider
%00¡n 2PNnfng such that for each i 2 N nfng, b(%00i ; N) = b(%n; N) and the ordering
other than b(%n; N) is the same as that of both %i and %0i. Note that since agent
n is the ¯rst dictator, fn(%n;%00¡n) = b(%n; N). Therefore, fi(%n;%00¡n) 6= b(%n; N)
for each i 2 N n fng. These imply that for each i 2 N n fng,
L(fi(%n;%00¡n);%00i ) µ L(fi(%n;%00¡n);%i);
L(fi(%n;%00¡n);%00i ) µ L(fi(%n;%00¡n);%0i):
By monotonicity (Fact 2), f(%n;%¡n) = f(%n;%00¡n) = f(%n;%0¡n). ¤
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B Appendix: Implementability of the strict core
solution
B.1 Dominant strategy implementation
To the best of our knowledge, no one has previously attempted to explicitly iden-
tify whether the strict core solution is dominant strategy implementable. Thus,
below, we show that the strict core solution is dominant strategy implementable by
exploiting the result of Mizukami and Wakayama (2007). They show that if a solu-
tion satis¯es strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness, then it is dominant
strategy implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism (see Theorem 2
in Mizukami and Wakayama, 2007).
Quasi-strong-non-bossiness: For each % 2PN , each i 2 N , and each %0i 2P,
if fi(%i;%00¡i) »i fi(%0i;%00¡i) for each %00¡i 2PNnfig, then f(%) = f(%0i;%¡i).
Proposition 5. The strict core solution is dominant strategy implemented by its
associated direct revelation mechanism.
Proof. It su±ces to show that the strict core solution C satis¯es quasi-strong-non-
bossiness. Let % 2PN , i 2 N , and %0i 2P be such that Ci(%i;%00¡i) »i Ci(%0i;%00¡i)
for each %00¡i 2 PNnfig. Since preferences are strict, Ci(%i;%00¡i) = Ci(%0i;%00¡i) for
each %00¡i 2 PNnfig. Thus, Ci(%) = Ci(%0i;%¡i). Since C satis¯es non-bossiness,
C(%) = C(%0i;%¡i).
B.2 Nash implementation in the case of two agents
Although the strict core solution is Nash implementable in the case where there are
at least three agents, it is not Nash implementable in the two-agent case.
Proposition 6. Assume n = 2. The strict core solution is not implementable in
Nash equilibria.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that the strict core solution is Nash implementable.
Then, there is a mechanism ¡ = (M; g) implementing the strict core solution C in
Nash equilibria. Here, M ´M1 £M2 is a message space and g : M ! X is an out-
come function. Given that i 2 N andm 2M , let gi(m) denote agent i's consumption
associated with a message pro¯le m. For each % 2PN , let NE(%;¡) µ M be the
set of all Nash equilibria of the mechanism ¡ at % 2PN and g(NE(%;¡)) be the
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set of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of ¡ at %. Since the mechanism ¡ = (M; g)
implements C,
g(NE((%121 ;%122 );¡)) = (1; 2) = C(%121 ;%122 ); (20)
g(NE((%121 ;%212 );¡)) = (1; 2) = C(%121 ;%212 );
g(NE((%211 ;%122 );¡)) = (2; 1) = C(%211 ;%122 );
g(NE((%211 ;%212 );¡)) = (1; 2) = C(%211 ;%212 ): (21)
Now, let m21;21 2 NE((%211 ;%212 );¡). Then, by (21),
1 = g1(NE((%211 ;%212 );¡)) = g1(m21;21) %211 g1(m01;m21;212 ) 8m01 2M1;
which implies that
g1(m
0
1;m
21;21
2 ) = 1 8m01 2M1: (22)
Next, let m12;12 2 NE((%121 ;%122 );¡). Then, by (20),
2 = g2(NE((%121 ;%122 );¡)) = g2(m12;12) %122 g2(m12;121 ;m02) 8m02 2M2;
which implies that
g2(m
12;12
1 ;m
0
2) = 2 8m02 2M2: (23)
Then, (22) and (23) together imply that
1 = g1(m
12;12
1 ;m
21;21
2 ) %211 g1(m01;m21;212 ) 8m01 2M1;
2 = g2(m
12;12
1 ;m
21;21
2 ) %122 g2(m12;121 ;m02) 8m02 2M2:
This implies that (m12;121 ;m
21;21
2 ) 2 NE((%211 ;%122 );¡). However, g(m12;121 ;m21;212 ) =
(1; 2) 6= (2; 1) = g(NE((%211 ;%122 );¡)), which is a contradiction.
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